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Abstract 
The practical discourse willingly uses the formula of “objective interpretation”, with 
no regards to its controversial nature that has been discussed in literature.  
The main aim of the article is to investigate what “objective interpretation” could 
mean and how it could be understood in the practical discourse, focusing on the 
understanding offered by judicature. 
The thesis of the article is that objective interpretation, as identified with 
textualists’ position, is not possible to uphold, and should be rather linked with 
conforming interpretation. And what this actually implies is that it is not the virtue 
of certainty and predictability – which are usually associated with objectivity- but 
coherence that makes the foundation of applicability of objectivity in law. 
What could be observed from the analyses, is that both the phenomenon of 
conforming interpretation and objective interpretation play the role of arguments in 
the interpretive discourse, arguments that provide justification that interpretation is 
not arbitrary or subjective. With regards to the important part of the ideology of 
legal application which is the conviction that decisions should be taken on the basis 
of law in order to exclude arbitrariness, objective interpretation could be read as a 
question “what kind of authority “supports” certain interpretation”? that is almost 
never free of judicial creativity and judicial activism.  
One can say that, objective and conforming interpretation are just another 
arguments used in legal discourse.  
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Introduction 
The concept of objective interpretation is a hot topic both in the theoretical and 
practical discourse. The philosophical literature deals with the issue, because of its 
controversial nature, the effect of different approaches and different ideas 
regarding both objectivity and the process of interpretation. On the other hand, the 
practical discourse willingly uses the formula of “objective interpretation” because 
of its pragmatic effectiveness in successful argumentation. At the outset, legal 
hermeneutics demystifies law and its application, stressing that it is not possible to 
provide objective interpretation and reach the most desirable values for law in an 
absolute way, such as: certainty, stability, applicability of formal rules. 
Hermeneutics is an attempt to identify the irreducible conditions of human 
understanding and by means of this to overcome the thesis that law is a set of 
formal rules exclusively (Leyh 2000, p. xii), and show that every interpretation is 
based on the pre-understanding. But still the concept of objective interpretation is a 
hot topic both in the theoretical and practical discourse. Philosophical literature 
deals with the issue, because of its controversial nature, that is the effect of 
different approaches and different ideas concerning both objectivity and the process 
of interpretation. On the other hand, the practical discourse seems eager to use the 
formula of “objective interpretation” because of its pragmatic effectiveness in 
successful argumentation.  
There are numerous opinions that both law and its interpretation should be 
objectified. They are both popular among legal theorists or philosophers, as among 
representatives of legal doctrine (Sójka Zielińska 2005, p. 73; Giaro 2005, p. 14). 
In a broader context, one can say that objectification of law becomes the central 
and fundamental aim of modern legal theory and at the same time the specific 
element that legitimizes law itself and reflection on it (Sulikowski 2008, p. 63). 
However in legal interpretation, which is argumentative activity, it has a special 
dimension. On the one hand, as the legal hermeneutic movement points out, 
interpretation is always at least partly subjective. On the other hand, the important 
part of the ideology of legal application is the conviction that decisions should be 
taken on the basis of law in order to exclude arbitrariness (Gizbert-Studnicki 1995). 
That is the place where objectivity appears – to provide justification that 
interpretation is not arbitrary or subjective but …as often has been claimed- 
objective. But what exactly could this mean?  
All the reason mentioned above inclined me investigate what “objective 
interpretation” could mean and how it could be understood in the practical 
discourse, focusing on the understanding offered by judicature. That is why I shall 
analyze to what extent claims about objective interpretation are justified in the light 
of strong and soft conceptions of objectivity and try to provide an explanation what 
they might mean in different contexts.  
In order to find the answer to the question how “the ideology of objectivity” can be 
defined or described, or in other words what legal objectivity means and how it 
works in the in the context of legal interpretation I am going to provide very briefly 
the puzzles of different (1) understandings of objectivity proposed on the 
theoretical level. Then, I am going to analyze (2) how lawyers understand objective 
interpretation and how it is used in practice in the legal world, especially from the 
point of view of legal objectivism. (3) At the next step of the analysis, I will try to 
support the thesis that objective interpretation, as identified with textualists’ 
position, is not possible to uphold, and should be rather linked with conforming 
interpretation. And what this actually implies is that it is not the virtue of certainty 
and predictability – which are usually associated with objectivity- but coherence 
that makes the foundation of applicability of objectivity in law. 
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1. Some puzzles about objectivity 
At the very basic level of expectations concerning law, objectivity provides 
values that constitute law, like public and positive character of the law, its 
universality and generality, its autonomy1, legitimacy, methods of legal 
justification, coherence and its power of authority. In this sense objectivity could be 
perceived as a necessity in law. 
Legal scholars’ books are crammed with different concepts of objectivity. The 
numerous publications dealing with this problem show that there are defenders and 
critics both of the concept of objectivity in general and legal objectivity in 
particular. Objectivity is used in many different senses and meanings. I would like 
to assume one of the many approaches to this topic. In jurisprudential literature, it 
is possible to find examples of strong, modest and minimal objectivity. If we 
divide the spectrum into two groups according to the activity of subject, the first 
group will be entirely connected with the object, namely the strong version of 
objectivity, and the second connected with an increasing role of the subject, namely 
the modest and minimal version of objectivity. Strong objectivity as completely 
independent of the subject is characterized as purely objective stance. Strong 
objectivity is the manifestation of the theory of realism, which rejects the 
dependence on the subject in regard to existence and perception. For example, a 
stone which exists completely independently from the subject or any of activity of 
this person, no matter whether the subject perceives it or not. The other two 
approaches of objectivity are connected with the activity of the subject, which is 
necessary and impossible to eliminate. The modest version of objectivity is 
characterized by reference to a subject determined by the ideal epistemological 
conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled to make it possible to think about 
objectivity as in some way independent of any personal bias. In this sense, for 
example, the activity of measuring could be objective. The effects of measuring 
would be the same regardless of the person who does it under the same conditions. 
One can observe that within the same group of notions it is possible to find 
different extensions of the subject’s indeterminacy. This is possible because the 
minimization of the subject’s intervention is not always possible to the same degree 
and there are situations where objectivity is desirable. The example of measuring is 
one of the strongest, but there are practically lots of situations in which it is 
impossible to eliminate the subject’s impact to a large extent. All these cases could 
be situated between the minimal version of objectivity and the strongest possible 
modest version. The minimal version of objectivity is based on the acceptance of 
majority in a certain group. Take fashion as an example. What is fashionable in a 
certain society or group is accepted by the majority of that group (Rossati 2004, p. 
275). Both modest and minimal versions of objectivity could be characterized as an 
attempt to minimize subjective elements, but with the reservation that subjective 
elements are not excluded entirely. It is important to point out that on the 
semantic, epistemological and ontological levels, there exist these three kinds of 
objectivity. 
The ideas that represent objectivity are necessary for law and they fulfill the main 
aims of law, namely its certainty, but at the same time also law’s coherence. When 
we apply the typology introduced above, one can say that objectivity in a strong 
sense is the guarantee of certainty while objectivity in a soft sense safeguards the 
value of coherence. 
2. Examples from judicature (Polish, Spanish, ECJ)  
In a body of judicial rulings it is possible to find arguments formulated on the basis 
on objective interpretation. However, while the dominant understanding of 
                                                 
1 The features that constitute legal order, rules of law, according R. Unger in Law in Modern Societies.  
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“objective interpretation” is mostly identified with the textualist position, the 
practice of the judiciary does not express such a totally homogenous standpoint.  
The position held by textualists is that judges should consider only the public 
meaning (the ordinary meaning of language) of the statutory text. This is opposed 
to the intentional approach to the process of interpretation. A very rough 
characterization of textualism displays that adherents of this doctrine "look at the 
statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound to the mind of a 
skilled, objectively reasonable user of words” (Easterbrook 1988, p. 65).  
1. The most common are cases where objective interpretation is identified directly 
with the textual position: it happens where courts directly name their 
interpretation as “objective interpretation2”, or report “objective interpretative 
doubts3” or “subjective interpretative doubts4” presented by one of the party. In 
discussing this context, I will deliver some examples where courts build up their 
justification around the argument of linguistic objective interpretation. It is also 
possible to quote fragments referring to both the “subjective meaning of legal 
norms5” and the “objective meaning of legal norms6.” How could it be understood?  
To grasp the essence of the problem, let us consider an example where the Polish 
Supreme Court prescribed as follows, “(…) the object of interpretation is the 
reading of a legal norm which is the most certain, which makes objective 
verification possible, and is accessible to common understanding at the same time. 
Words (language) are quite an obvious way of expressing legal norms by the 
entitled organs and at the same time there have to be certain grounds that allow 
the legal substance to be understood by the addressees. 7”. In another judgment 
one can read, “The opinion of The Supreme Court interpreting the term “reveal” is 
that in the objective theory of interpretation, which assures the correct reading of 
the meaning of concrete legal norms and decoding of legal norms, the essence lies 
in decoding, not the intention or will of legislator. Making an extreme simplification, 
the decisive role should be attached to what the legislator has written in the legal 
text, and not what he wanted to write8”. In these fragments the Court not only 
explained what objective interpretation means but also expressed a manifesto of 
the textual position.  
One of the very popular method used by textualists is the application of the plain, 
common or public meaning reconstructed on the basis of dictionaries. It is well 
illustrated by the following example, where the Court claims that it has performed 
objective interpretation because the judges followed the meaning presented in a 
dictionary entry9. The Court applied the general clause of “stable ties” and resorted 
to dictionaries, however the judges failed to justify why they had chosen a certain 
meaning out of many other dictionary entries (Solan 1993). The Polish 
Administrative Court wanted to find out if a foreigner had established an economic 
connection with Poland. The Court claimed it was possible to make an objective 
evaluation based on different criteria. The understanding delivered by the foreigner, 
the party in this case, is only one of the elements that have to be taken into 
account. They found the expression “stable economic ties” unclear and decided that 
                                                 
2 Wyrok z dnia 30 września 2004 r. Sąd Najwyższy IV CK 713/03 (Judgement of Polish Supreme Court 
30.09.2004.) 
3 Wyrok z dnia 16 stycznia 2006 r. Trybunał Konstytucyjny SK 30/05 (Judgement of Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal, 16.01.2006) 
4 Postanowienie z dnia 25 maja 2005 r. Trybunał Konstytucyjny SK1/4 (Resolution of Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal, 25. 05. 2005) 
5 Wyrok z dnia 27 kwietnia 2007 r. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie VI SA/Wa 319/07, 
LEX nr 339031, (Judgement of Voivodship Administrative Court in Warsaw27.04.2007.) 
6 Wyrok Sąd Apelacyjny w Katowicach z dnia 15 maja 2008 roku, II AKa 13/08LEX nr 447031, Biul.SAKa 
2008/3/4, KZS 2008/9/41, KZS 2008/9/42 (Judgement of Appealed Court in Katowice 15.05.2008) 
7 SN III RN 145/00 OSNP 2002/19450, 2001.11.09. (Judgement of Polish Supreme Court) 
8 Uchwała z dnia 29 października 2004 r. Sąd Najwyższy I KZP 24/04 (Resolution of Supreme Court) 
9 Wyrok z dnia 6 marca 2003 r. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (do 2003.12.31) w Warszawie V SA 
1923/02 (Judgement of Administrative Supreme Court in Warsaw) 
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it had to be made precise in these particular circumstances. The Court could have 
evaluated this in a number of ways but chose to start with literal interpretation. The 
Court used a Polish dictionary to define “stable” as something that is “resistant and 
durable, long lasting, firm and gives hope for the future.” These chosen fragments 
from the dictionary disqualified the plaintiff’s view because in the period of 4 years 
of doing business, he had not achieved serious financial success. At some point he 
had even suffered loss, though he was still able to support his family with his 
earnings. However, another Polish dictionary10 defines “stable” as “firmly 
connected/linked with the place or the person” or “to be somewhere very often” or 
“to occur with regularity”. It seems that by invoking these meanings it could be 
possible to justify exactly the opposite decision, not the one delivered by the court.  
As critics of textualism indicate, dictionaries are only indexes of meanings that 
appear in an exemplary context in which a certain world may appear. It means that 
we cannot find one right definition nor stable non-contextual sense in the 
dictionaries – that is expected to have the value of objectivity.11 However, one has 
also to consider another line of criticism against textualism (Solan 1997, p. 2; 
Eskridge, Frickey 1990), particularly the possibility of its “objective” status. Many 
authors stress that interpretation always refers to the supposed intention of the 
legislator (Fish 2005, p. 629).  
Three main arguments support this thesis:  
− The view stressed by linguists, who argue that the meaning of the text and 
meaning of the utterance cannot be opposed. That is to say, sentence 
meaning makes a combination of the meaning of particular expressions and 
syntactic rules and the intention of the author who wishes to achieve certain 
ends. Analyzing sentences without any contextualization is a complete 
fallacy in terms of language.  
− The argument from court rulings, when courts expressly state that the literal 
interpretation is not enough to determine the meaning, and that the 
intention of the legislator, the aim of the statute must be taken into 
account12.  
− An additional argument comes from the examination of the judgments by 
Justice Scalia, a key follower of the textual approach to interpretation. The 
analysis of his judgments clearly shows that interpretation has an intentional 
character (MacGowan 2008, p. 129) 
That is why it is justified to say that the textualists’ position could be approached in 
two ways: as a method of determining intentional meaning, as hinted above, or as 
a method of following rules and understanding their meaning. The second 
alternative is based on Wittgenstein’s distinction between understanding and 
interpretation. 
For Wittgenstein, meaning is treated as the core of the notion that could be 
objective; interpretation is the next level, which is dependent on individual 
elements, and so the product of interpretation could be variable in different cases. 
Meaning is a necessary introduction to interpretation, so following this idea, 
meaning appears as something that has a firm core, which gives the possibility for 
interpretation, because without understanding there is no room for interpretation at 
all. As a consequence, the most important question is what makes certain 
interpretations objective? What kind of justification gives the right to claim that an 
interpretation is objective? One answer proposed by the semantic antirealists is 
                                                 
10 PWN Dictionary of Polish Language, on line: http://sjp.pwn.pl/ 
11 See more Weinstein (2005). 
12 Uchwała NSA z 20 marca 2000 r., sygn. FPS 14/99, ONSA 2000/3/92. (Resolution of Administrative 
Supreme Court in Warsaw) or Wyrok z dnia 31 stycznia 2006 r. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny w 
Warszawie I FSK450/05 (Judgment Resolution of Administrative Supreme Court in Warsaw) 
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that common acceptance of a certain community provides the justification for 
treating an interpretation as objectively valid.  
Wittgenstein’s thoughts represent a skeptical position, but it is not necessary to 
reject the possibility of objectivity in a stronger sense. Meanings of terms are not 
determined by facts, but this does not exclude the possibility of making claims 
about objectivity or make it necessary to consider it only in a minimal sense (a 
meaning that is applied and accepted by the majority in the interpreting 
community).  
Considering the problem of dependency between facts and interpretation, one 
conclusion is that the meaning of facts is determined by a paradigm of 
interpretation and the conditions that are formulated by this paradigm. So the next 
problem that has to be considered is how this meaning is determined, and how the 
meaning of legal facts is settled in the context of normative legal reality, because 
the theory that determines meaning is also the part of the necessary paradigm. I 
will come back to this question at the end of the paper. 
3. Other puzzels of objective legal interpretation 
A. A specific formation based on reference to the objective theory of 
interpretation has been established in the doctrine of law13. According to 
it, the feature of objectivity is assigned to the certain categories that are 
provided°and°widely°accepted°by°legal°doctrine. 
In one of the ECJ rulings one can read “according to judicature, the notion of 
serious difficulties is an objective one.14” It means that there is a commonly 
accepted way of evaluating, of exercising judicial discretion based on the 
same method applied in similar situations. It is exercised in conformity with 
the tendencies in the judicature.  
B. In ECJ case law one may find exactly the opposite understanding of 
objective interpretation, which says that objective interpretation of legal 
rules or a piece of legislation is identified on the base of its aim15. All this 
means that not literal meaning but the aim of the legal regulation has been 
associated with objective interpretation. Such an understanding could be 
justified by the teleological character of European law and necessity of its 
translation into many languages of the Union.16 
C.  Objective interpretation as performed by the judge or required by law 
itself°-°some°examples°extracted°from°Spanish°judicature 
Some extracts from Spanish courts judgments state that “objective 
                                                 
13 Wyrok Sąd Apelacyjny w Katowicach z dnia 5 marca 2009 r. V ACa 484/08, LEX nr 508538 (Judgment 
of Appealed Court in Katowice) 
14 JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) 3 March 2010 “It must also be borne in mind, 
however, that, according to the case-law, the notion of serious difficulties is an objective one. Whether 
or not such difficulties exist requires investigation of both the circumstances under which the contested 
measure was adopted and its content. That investigation must be conducted objectively, comparing the 
grounds of the decision with the information available to the Commission when it took a decision on the 
compatibility of the disputed aid with the common market. (…) (Prayon-Rupel v Commission, cited in 
paragraph 126 above, paragraph 47; see, to that effect, Case T-49/93 SIDE v Commission [1995] 
ECR II-2501, paragraph 60). The applicant bears the burden of proving the existence of serious 
difficulties and may discharge that burden of proof by reference to a body of consistent evidence, 
concerning, first, the circumstances and the length of the preliminary examination procedure 
and, second, the content of the contested decision. 
15 Judgment of the Tribunal, (Grand Chamber), 12.01.2010, C-341/08. 
16 OPINION 2/00 OF THE COURT 6 December 2001 „It points out that, in accordance with the Court's 
case-law, the choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial 
review, which include the aim and content of the measure as a whole (see Case C-84/94 United 
Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 25, and Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR 
I-6177). The mere presence of commercial policy elements in an environmental agreement cannot have 
the effect of transforming it into a trade agreement, just as the presence of environmental factors in an 
agreement which is essentially a trade agreement does not alter the agreement's commercial character”. 
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interpretation of a legal text refers to “voluntas legis” 17 or that “The 
interpretation performed by the claimant contradicts the objective 
interpretation, that is, the interpretation performed by the judge, 18 Here, 
objective means “correct” interpretation. The phrase “objective 
interpretation” appears also as a party allegation, in which the party affirms 
that within the challenged decision, the Supreme Court interpreted 
objectively the applicable rule19. In a different case the Court defines its own 
interpretation as objective to indicate that such interpretation is the correct 
one.20 
Other°objective°interpretation: 
There are also different meanings of “objective interpretation” that cannot 
be classified within one coherent group. That is why I list some senses that 
appeared during the research: 
1. In one of its ruling the court characterizes objective interpretation as 
“logical” interpretation. It is used to indicate that an interpretation which 
does not lead to a logical error should be considered objective21. 
2. Objective interpretation of statutes implies not only grammatical 
arguments but also sociological –ideological, moral and economic– 
arguments revealing the spirit of the community in every single historical 
moment. Objective interpretation means aim-addressed interpretation.22 
All the introduced examples in section B introduced the process of how to conform, 
adjust the interpretation of certain legal rules to the legal system and legal reality, 
that have to be objective.  
4. Other arguments against objective interpretation 
There are many arguments indicating that the theory of objectivity of textual 
interpretation hides different, very often non-objective, values and processes 
behind its quite innocent thesis. I would say that this theory plays completely 
opposite role from the one we might expect. I would claim that the misleading 
power of the theory of objective interpretation plays the role of institutionalized 
uncertainty. Let me offer few arguments to support this claim. Biblical tradition of 
interpretation gives examples indicating that oral tradition delivered more faithful 
transmission and is closer to the original version than written interpretation 
(Jackson 2000). Biblical interpretation shows that oral tradition is based on pictures 
and is potentially more objective. The law focuses on written tradition and on literal 
meaning, and what I would like to prove is that these are less objective factors 
than the oral tradition. Contemporary socio-linguist Basil Bernstein makes a 
distinction between oral and written traditions and assesses them by different types 
of codes, which influence the meaning of expressions. Oral tradition is based on a 
restricted code and written tradition on an elaborated code. Non-written social 
knowledge and rules operating as unspoken code have the function of 
contextualization and determination of meanings. Elaborated codes arise out of 
context and that is why they have a greater need to be explained (Jackson 2000, p. 
447). When we consider the code of Western lawyers, we have the rules expressed 
by the legislator in advance, on top of which rules of logic and different types of 
legal reasoning are to be applied before the judgment can be made. So one can 
draw the conclusion that this unspoken code applied by lawyers is the last instance 
of deciding about the final interpretation. It is determining what the rule actually 
means when taking the final decision.  
                                                 
17 Criminal chamber, (8/V/02) (16/X/01). 
18 Labour chamber, (9/XII/99) 
19 Constitutional Court, (27/X/94). 
20 Constitutional Court, (31/III/82). 
21 Labour chamber, (2/II/95). 
22 Administrative chamber, (25/IV/96, 26/III/96, 12/I/96) 
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From one side, exactly from the top, objectivity is assessed as one of the premises 
of law. Law has to be objective, both on the level of abstract rules and on the level 
of their application. A clear example of this has been shown in the group of 
understandings of objectivity explained by creation on the part of competent 
authorities, their power of authority. Objectivity is assessed from the bottom to all 
the legal creation in an institutional way, and it holds the power of law's authority. 
This accords with the Kelsenian picture of law, as a pyramid.  
There is also a style of argumentation and a way of proceeding that binds lawyers 
to a certain form. But behind this form, the content is not necessarily objective. 
Actually, following legal hermeneutics, one could even say that it is never objective 
because, in grasping the law as tool that needs to be employed in a situation of 
conflict, the objective solution can be only be applied in a very weak sense. This is 
why I think the only sensible claim about the objectivity of law is from the formal 
point of view: as one of the assessment criteria required by law and administration 
of justice. 
On the other hand, there is this kind of objectivity that has to be employed from 
the bottom up, and this type is realized according to the principle based on the 
acceptance of a group of reference. And, as it is known, there is a pattern of 
successive argumentation and justification, imitating a quasi-scientific style of 
presenting arguments of different kinds. As critics of objectivity stress, law is the 
tool of implementation of justice according to the interests of certain groups of 
people and it uses the category of objectivity to represent their way of thinking as 
the best possible way. But, as it becomes just a style based on formal conditions, 
objectivity changes its character and becomes a tool of rhetoric. I see the 
postmodern explanation of the definition of objectivity in a weak sense, so-called 
minimal objectivity, as compatible with what was presented above. This definition is 
based on common acceptance by majority and a style of juridical argumentation 
that is aimed at convincing the auditorium that “this solution is objective” and 
realizing a “perceived objective justice”. This formula sounds the same in the lips of 
the parties, their defendants, and the judges representing the court when delivering 
their justifications of the final decisions. However objectivity is a tool of successful 
argumentation because of its rhetoric power, I would not narrow down its role only 
to this. There are also certain conditions that have to be fulfilled. Judges necessarily 
have to take decisions and gain the acceptance of an audience or the system of 
higher instance. To fulfill these conditions, elucidation has to be convincing, and 
objective argumentation is the way to provide an acceptance and common validity 
of the delivered decision. This version of objectivity shows it both as necessary for 
the official discourse and external argumentation. 
“Biblical law implies that the linguistic rules are not to be identified with the notion 
of literal meaning, but rather with their narrative contextual sense” (Jackson 2000, 
p. 434). That is why it is highly controversial to link objectivity to textual 
interpretation. There are many situations in law where the variable context can 
modify “the literal meaning”. That is why meanings taken from the dictionary could 
be objective, as one court ruling states, but cannot be identified with objective 
truth or correctness per se. It is the beginning of the process of interpretation, 
because if somebody looks up dictionary entries, it means that he/she does not 
understand and starts to interpret.  
5. Conclusions 
In the light of all arguments introduced above, the main thesis of this text states 
that: 
Objective interpretation in a strong sense, as identified with textualist positions, is 
not possible to uphold, that is why it should be abandoned. What is also revealed 
by the present analysis is that textualist interpretation should not be identified with 
objectivity. Rather than that, objectivity of certain interpretations should be sought 
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outside language itself. Ronald Dworkin described this problem and named it as 
"semantic sting", which indicates that meaning of certain interpreted expression 
could be found outside language. 
All the other examples I have shown refer to objective interpretation in a soft 
sense. This means that they should be rather linked with the concept of conforming 
interpretation. But what it also means is that such an interpretation in order to be 
objective in a weak sense has to be justified anyhow. As opposed to the strong 
objectivity of interpretation, which is based on authority mainly (dictionaries), the 
soft objectivity needs justification. So there is a direct link between objectivity and 
authority in the body of question: “what kind of authority “supports” certain 
interpretation”? That is why the question about objective interpretation is the 
question about objective validity of certain interpretation. One of the possible 
answers could be that the interpretative community shaped by legal culture should 
decide about the rules of interpretation.23  
Although it is very controversial to link textualism with objectivity this is a very 
common practice in judicial decisions. The arguments about strong objective 
interpretation (textualist) are mainly linked with the value of certainty, although 
they are not possible to be upheld. The rest of the meaning of the concept of 
objective interpretation represents the idea of soft – minimal understanding of 
objectivity that foster the value of coherence. All above arguments support the 
thesis that objective interpretation does not fulfill aims that it “should” realize, 
those of certainty, predictability, and transparency. However, if one looks at the 
phenomenon of “objective interpretation” from the point of view of soft conceptions 
of objectivity, one may learn that “objective interpretation” could play the role 
slightly different from the one that could be expected, but not less important. It is 
possible to observe that argument based on objectivity implements the virtue of 
legal coherence. It is used as an argument that provides justification in accordance 
with the necessary assumption of objectivity of law. In all the presented cases weak 
a sense of the objective plays the role of an argument that allows to conform and 
justify a certain decision. The only question is how the conform interpretation 
should be justified, how does it come that certain interpretations are objectively 
valid? 
This could be demonstrated for example by applying different argumentative 
models offered by Ch. Perelman, J. Habermas or R. Alexy. For Perelman -
acceptance of universal authority, for Habermas -justified consensus, for Alexy- 
results of the procedure of rational discourse, will deliver objective validity of 
justification of certain interpretation. But this is a topic for the next article.  
One can say, that soft conceptions of objectivity are so weak, that this is kind of 
abuse to apply this concept to legal discourse. However, what should be stressed 
here is that our perception of social reality has changed as well - we don't apply 
strong scientific concepts to the legal or social reality anymore. Modernity or the 
postmodern approach offer us a sense of perception expressed in soft terms. The 
transition from the doctrine of realism to antirealism clearly shows the process of 
change of the paradigm of interpretation of reality. The concept of objectivity has 
changed and instead of its semantic aspects, which may be very often misleading, 
one should consider it in accordance with the factual role it plays in the legal or 
social discourse. 
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